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INTRODUCTION

Overview, Structure, and Purpose of Note

In 1972, Florida began a slow, laborious process to establish the
country's most advanced comprehensive growth planning scheme. In
that year, the Florida Legislature passed the Environmental Land
and Water Management Act (the Act). A cornerstone of the Act is
the requirement that development projects that exceed a certain size
undergo a special, more particularized review by planning authorities.
The Act differentiated these projects, labeled Developments of Regional Impact (DRIs), because their effects impact the citizens of more
than one county. Developments of this magnitude worried community
planning authorities, and this worry provided grounds to assert the
regulatory police power of the state. Thus, particularized planning
requirements, requirements which would eventually affect all developments in Florida, were first imposed on developments whose effects
were most apparent.
To avoid improperly infringing developers' rights, the Act includes
a vesting provision. Projects that commenced and were continuing in
good faith before July 1, 1973 are allowed to continue. Significantly,
the Act also recognizes that developers might rely, to their detriment,
on other acts or omissions of a local government prior to July 1, 1973.
To avoid frustrating developers' expectations, the Act allows projects
to continue if developers had obtained "other authorization" to continue. Therefore, the legislature recognizes that equitable estoppel
might prevent application of the Act to certain projects. After the
Act took effect, though, projects theoretically could continue only if
they acquired a local government development order described by the
Act.
This note begins with a brief overview of the DRI process. Section
II of this note addresses whether the common law principles of equitable estoppel survive the statutory DRI framework; specifically,
whether a developer might assert equitable estoppel to escape the
otherwise tight control of government over DRI projects. The section
begins by discussing equitable estoppel in general terms and whether
a developer could use equitable estoppel as a way of mitigating acts
of bad faith by a local government. The section next addresses the
inapplicability of equitable estoppel to binding letters of interpretation
from the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) or to preliminary
development agreements between developers and local governments.
Next, the section examines the results of applying equitable estoppel
to other areas of the pre-and post-application procedure. After examining these results the section argues against the application of equit-
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able estoppel to pre-application procedures absent bad faith by local
governments. Conversely, section II argues in favor of applying equitable estoppel after final approval to ensure the vested status of a
project. Section II concludes by evaluating whether DRI procedures
continue to be an effective or even necessary part of the state planning
framework.
Section III looks at the criteria used to evaluate substantial deviations to vested DRI projects. Substantial deviation issues are Very
different issues from the equitable estoppel questions addressed in
section II. Section III assumes that the project is vested, either
through statutory procedures or through the application of equitable
estoppel. However, section III focuses on the requirement of consistency with a comprehensive plan and how these requirements effect
the evaluation of substantial deviations. Section III concludes by
evaluating whether current theories on consistency efficiently achieve
the goals of comprehensive planning.
Although section II and section III address admittedly different
questions, this note attempts to give the reader a glimpse of the whole
range of DRI vesting issues. Section II focuses on obtaining vesting
at the start of the project, and section III focuses on deviations to a
vested project that could, or should, cause the project to lose its
vested status. The purpose is to provide the reader with an understanding of the issues presented by vesting decisions and the effectiveness of statutory DRI vesting provisions. But first, we examine the
basic DRI process.
B.

Brief Overview of the DRI Process

As discussed more fully in the text, the main conceptual problem
with DRI vesting procedures is that the vesting procedures of Florida
Statutes § 380.06 arguably preclude the application of equitable estoppel. Nevertheless, specific provisions of the DRI process might allow
a developer to assert equitable estoppel. To facilitate understanding
of the problem, a brief overview of the process follows. This overview
is not intended to be exhaustive. Also, the theoretical application of
many of the provisions examined below will vary from real world
application. The goal is to provide merely a rudimentary understanding
of what a DRI is and how it differs from other developments.
The DRI process began almost two decades ago when the Florida
Legislature passed the Environmental Land and Water Management
Act (Act).' Section 380.06 of that Act creates a novel procedure for
1. FL. STAT. § 380 (Supp. 1972). In the original statute, the DRI provisions covered only
two pages and consisted of only twelve subsections. Id. § 380.06. Today, it covers well over a
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reviewing certain types of developments, namely those whose overall
impact affects the "citizens of more than one county";2 that is, a region.
A combination of statute3 and administrative rule 4 defines the type of
development subject to this Act.
At the outset of a development project, a developer must decide
whether the proposed project is a "development '' 5 subject to DRI
review. The Act presumes certain types of development6 are amenable
to DRI review. Others, such as agricultural uses, are specifically

dozen pages and consists of dozens of subsections. Id. The changes, however, have not been
consistent. The problems arising from these inconsistencies are discussed more fully later in
the text. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. The overview given here is only a basic
outline, designed to give the reader some understanding of how the DRI system works. I would
again like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Frith article, see Frith, Florida'sDevelopment
of Regional Impact ProcessPractice and Procedure, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 71, 77 (1985),
as well as the DRI Course Outline prepared by the Florida Chamber of Commerce for the
Growth Management Short Course held April 18-20, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida.
2. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) ([991).
3. Id. § 380.06(2). Generally, these provisions allow the state land planning agency (DCA)
to make rules and guidelines as to what will constitute a DRI. Id. However, the statute mandates
that the DCA consider certain elements when formulating its rules. Id. § 380.06(2)(b). These
elements include effect on pollution levels, pedestrian or vehicular traffic, number of residents
or employees, size of the site, likelihood of additional or subsidiary development, extent of added
demand to energy sources, and the unique qualities of the area in question. Id. The statute
also provides that developments between 80% and 100% of the threshold set by the administrative
rule will not be presumed DRIs. Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(2)(a). Conversely, developments between
100% and 120% of the threshold set by administrative rule will be presumed DRIs. Id. §
380.06(2)(d)(2)(b). Both of these presumptions are rebuttable. Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(2). Developments
at or below 80% of the threshold set by administrative rule are not required to undergo DRI
review. Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(1)(a). Those developments above 120% of the threshold set by administrative rule are required to undergo DRI review. Id. § 380.06(2)(d)(1)(b).
4. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-24.001 to .032 (1989). Included as DRIs are airports,
attractions and recreational facilities, electrical generating facilities and transmission lines, hospitals, industrial plants and industrial parks, mining operations, office parks, petroleum storage
facilities, port facilities, residential developments, schools, shopping centers, and certain multiuse developments. Id. Each of these criteria applies only to operations above a certain size.
For instance, a port facility is deemed a DRI unless it is "designed primarily for the mooring
or storage of watercraft used exclusively for sport or pleasure [and contains] less than one
hundred slips for moorings." Id. r. 28-24.009. Residential developments have the most extensive
threshold requirements because the decision rests on a sliding scale. See id. r. 28-24.010. Whether
the residential project is a DRI changes depending on the size of the county. Id. For example,
in counties that have a population of less than 25,000, a development of 250 dwelling units is
a DRI. Id. r. 28-24.010(a). In contrast, in counties of over 500,000 people, a development will
need 3000 dwelling units to pass the DRI threshold. Id. r. 28-24.010(f).
5. See FLA. STAT. §§ 380.04(1), .06(1) (1991).
6. See supra notes 3-4.
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exempted.7 To further complicate the question, most projects are of
a type subject to DRI review, but are not required to undergo the
DRI review procedure unless they exceed a certain size."
Because determining whether a development is a DRI can be controversial, 9 the Act establishes a procedure for developers to determine
the status of their projects. 10 This procedure allows developers to
obtain a binding letter of interpretation from the DCA. 11 The binding
letter applies to the developer, the county, and the regional planning
board and is one way developers answer the threshold question of
12
whether their project is subject to DRI review.
If the development is a DRI, the developer contacts the Regional
Planning Council (RPC)' s to arrange a preapplication conference. 14 The
purpose of the conference with the RPC is to make the process of
DRI approval more efficient. 5 The RPC conference is more than just
a preliminary step in the approval process; it is a key segment.16 The
RPC gathers vast amounts of information to make its report - infor-

7. FLA. STAT. § 380.04(3)(e) (1991). It is curious why the statute and rules omit agricultural
uses from DRI review. For the most part, agricultural activities profoundly affect surrounding
lands. One need only look at the effects of sugar cane cultivation on the purity of Lake Okeechobee
for proof of the harmful side effects caused by agricultural production. However; the impact of
commercial agriculture on our environment is a topic beyond the scope of this note. The omission
of agricultural uses, though, may reflect the traditional notions of zoning and planning such as
Euclidean zoning and the unthinking protection of farmlands that were in force at the time the
DRI framework was developed. The problems caused by these now outdated notions are discussed more fully later in the text. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
8. See FLA. STAT. §§ 380.06(2)(d)(1)-(2), .06(24) (1991).
9. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; see also Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett
Pines, 333 So. 2d 472 (2d D.C.A. 1976), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1977).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4) (Supp. 1990). Generally, this section sets up the process to
obtain a binding letter. It also includes the criteria that DCA uses in evaluating whether the
proposed development is a DRI. Id. However, the binding letter itself does not substitute for
a final local development order. Orlando Cent. Park Inc., 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 944 (No.
89-DS-9A, Dep't of Community Affairs) (Mar. 26, 1990); accord infranotes 63-64 and accompanying text.
11. FL" STAT. § 380.06(4) (Supp. 1990).
12. Id.
13. See Frith, supranote 1, at 81-85. Regional Planning Councils (RPCs) are the agencies
designated by DCA to "exercise responsibilities under law in a particular region of the state,"
FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(18) (1991), and are designated by the DCA pursuant to id. § 380.031(15).
14. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(a) (1991).
15. Id. § 380.06(7)(b). Specifically, the purpose is 'to encourage reduction of paperwork,
to discourage unnecessary gathering of data, and to encourage the coordination of the development of regional impact review process with federal, state, and local environmental reviews
when such reviews are required by law." Id.
16. See Frith, supra note 1, at 81.
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mation that the final approving authority will require. 17 The RPC also
adds enormous technical expertise in project development.18 This expertise is often invaluable to a developer in refining the final development
proposal so that the proposal has the best chance for approval.19 The
RPC gathers this information, prepares its report, and transmits the
report to the appropriate local government for decision °
After receiving the RPC's report, the local government gives notice
of a public hearing.21 This hearing provides the developer, the RPC,
and interested parties an opportunity to give their views of the project.2 The local government then issues its decision for or against the
project. 3 This decision is the final development order and the Act
requires that the order contain certain findings of fact and conclusions
of law.? The final development order must also address the proposed

17. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 380.06(12) (1991) (This section provides criteria on which
the RPC prepares its reports. Included in these criteria are evaluations of the economic impact
of a project and its effect on environmental or historical resources, sewage and public facilities,
transportation, and affordable housing among other things.).
Extensive factfinding may prove important. Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
imposed "close judicial review" to rezoning decisions by a local government. See Snyder v.
Brevard County Bd. of Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1991). This standard of review
may require more factually based decisions by local governments. See id. Because § 380.06
leaves the RPC's decision non-binding on local governments, "close judicial review" is probably
unwarranted in the DRI context. However, if "close judicial review" expands into the DRI
context, the RPC's recommendation may become important. Specifically, the decision of the
RPC might restrict local government's flexibility if the local government cannot provide sufficient
facts to contradict or modify the recommendation of the RPC.
18. See Frith, supra note 1, at 83 (noting the special importance of the RPC to local
governments in rural areas).
19. See id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(12)(a) (1991). The report, however, is not binding on the local
government although the local government must consider the report when maldng its decision.
See Frith, supra note 1, at 83; see also FLA. STAT. § 380.06(14)(c) (1991). This becomes important
when deciding whether a developer reasonably relied on an approval by the RPC. If the developer
has not reasonably relied, the developer cannot apply equitable estoppel. See infra notes 70-72
and accompanying text. But see supra note 17; infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing
possibility of closer judicial review of local government decisions).
21. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10)-(11) (1991).
22. Id. § 380.06(11). Notice must be given to the DCA, the RPC, agencies involved in
conceptual reviews when applicable, and other persons designated by the DCA. Id.
23. Id. § 380.06(15). The local government has 30 days within which to render a decision.
Id. It should also issue its order simultaneously with other needed permits or approvals. Id.
The local government can also make any changes needed in the comprehensive plan and can
make as many changes as needed without regard to limits on amendments otherwise applicable.
See id. § 163.3187(1)(b).
24. Id. § 380.06(11)(c). The order must set out monitoring procedures, the name of the
local official responsible for monitoring, compliance dates, termination date, annual report re-
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development's consistency with the local comprehensive plan. Most
importantly, the final development order also vests development rights
for the project.- The local government then sends the order to DCA,
the developer, and the RPC.2 Finally, the developer records the order

in the counties where the project is located.Y It is only at this point
that development may begin.2 Although this overview is extremely
simplified, it gives a reader some idea of the process a developer must
go through to obtain approval for a DRI.
II.

DOES EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SURVIVE INTO THE STATUTORY

DRI FRAMEWORK?
A.

Equitable Estoppel versus Vested Rights

The doctrines of equitable estoppel and vested rights are closely
related doctrines.2 They are, however, distinct. According to one commentator, though, "Florida courts have employed these concepts inter-

quirements, extent of vesting, types of changes requiring further review, and a legal description
of the property. Id. Another area of major importance is the amount of construction needed to
meet concurrency requirements. Id. To be issued, the development order must also be consistent
with local and state comprehensive plans. Id. § 380.06(14).
25. Id. § 380.06(20).
26. Id. § 380.07(2).
27. Id. § 380.06(15)(f).
28. Id. § 380.06(5). Although the regular DRI process allows final construction only after
a final development order issues, construction can commence prior to this point under a preliminary development agreement. See id. § 380.06(8). However, the statute bars the assertion of
equitable estoppel based on a preliminary development agreement. Id. § 380.06(8)(a)-(b).
29. Rhodes, Hauser & DeMeo, Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictability in a Changing
Regulatory System, 13 STET. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (quoting Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application
of the Principlesof Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L.
ANN. 63, 64-65). Specifically, Heeter states that
[t]he defense of estoppel is derived from equity, but the defense of vested rights
reflects principles of common and constitutional law. Similarly, their elements are
different. Estoppel focuses upon whether it would be inequitable to allow the
government to repudiate its prior conduct; vested rights upon whether the owner
acquired real property rights which cannot be taken away by governmental regulation.
Id. The Rhodes article provides a good overview of significant cases on equitable estoppel in
Florida. See also Jaslow, Understanding the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel in Florida, 38
MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1984). Parts of the Rhodes article have been updated recently. Rhodes &
Sellers, Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictabilityin a Changing Regulatory System, 20 STET.
L. REV. 475 (1991). Especially important is the discussion on the growing body of constitutionallybased rights in addition to legal or equitable rights. Id. at 476-77. Again, the existence and use
of separate constitutional attacks against local government actions is beyond the scope of this
note.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

changeably." ° This loose usage may result from the similarity in results of the two doctrines. However, both the DRI framework and
the recent modifications in growth management laws31 attempt to restrict a developer's ability to acquire vested rights. Therefore, the
theoretical distinction between equitable estoppel and vested rights
is becoming increasingly important in the real world.
On one hand, equitable estoppel has equitable, not legal, foundations.- For this reason, courts look for such factors as a developer's
substantial change of position, reliance on a government's act or omission, and fundamental unfairness.3 An oft-quoted summation is that:
"The theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than the application
of the rules of fair play."- One court explained more specifically that
"[o]ne party will not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome
mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment
of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon." The doctrine
remains alive today 36 and may apply even in the face of the Growth
Management Act.3 7 To prove estoppel, a developer must show a sub-

30. Rhodes, Hauser & DeMeo, supra note 29, at 2.
31. The effectiveness of the modifications is a subject of much debate. See infra note 37.
32. Id.
33. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15-16 (Fla. -1976)
(citing Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963)); see also Rhodes, Hauser
& DeMeo, supra note 29, at 3.
34. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
35. Id. at 573.
36. A recent discussion of the doctrine occurs in City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp.,
although the court denied the application of equitable estoppel. 537 So. 2d 641, 644-49 (3d
D.C.A.), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1989). Interestingly, the court in R.L.J.S. Corp.
openly acknowledged its interchanging of the terms "vested rights" and "equitable estoppel."
Id. at 644 n.4. (citing Rhodes, Hauser & DeMeo, supra note 29; Jaslow, supra note 29).
37. Although the doctrine has not been repudiated by statute or other legislative means,
a great debate currently rages over whether equitable estoppel survived the Growth Management
Act of 1985. The most recent salvo in this controversy was fired by J. Dudley Goodlette and
Kevin G. Coleman. Goodlette & Coleman, Did Equitable Estoppel Survive the Growth Management Act?, 72 FLA. B.J. 71 (Mar. 1990). In that article, the authors point out the vagueness
of the term "final local development order" in the Growth Management Act. Id. This vagueness
severely undermines any interpretation of the Act that might exclude the application of equitable
estoppel because a developer might reasonably rely on any one of several development approvals.
Id. Moreover, the authors argue that general concepts of statutory construction lead to the
conclusion that equitable estoppel, a common law concept, continues into the Growth Management
Act unless explicitly excluded by the statute. Id. at 72-73. However applicable this argument
might be to equitable estoppel questions in the DRI framework, the article focuses on non-DRI
questions. Id. at 71. Because the broader question of whether equitable estoppel survives the
Growth Management Act for non-DRI projects is beyond the scope of this note, it will be ignored.
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stantial change of position in good faith reliance on an act or omission
of the government. What constitutes "reliance," "substantial change
of position," or an "act or omission of government" varies a great deal
and depends on the particular factual situation39 Despite its vagueness,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel has a firm place in Florida jurispru40
dence.
On the other hand, vested rights have legal, not equitable, foundations. 41 For this reason, courts do not look to elements of equity. 42
Instead, courts consider whether the development meets the statutory
requirements that will allow a project to proceed. 43 If the project
meets these requirements, then it proceeds unmolested by subsequent
changes in the law that would otherwise make the project illegal.The developer does not have to show reliance or a substantial change
of position. Most importantly, the developer does not have to show
that equity is in his or her favor. All that a developer need show is
compliance with the statutory requirements. 45 For a DRI, statutory
compliance means obtaining a final local government development
oler in accordance with Florida Statutes § 380.06.46

38. See generally Seimon, Larsen & Porter, Vested Rights: Balancing Public and Private

Development Expectations, URB. LAND INST. (1982) (discussing application of vested rights
analysis).
39. See Jaslow, supra note 29, at 220-24 (providing cites and explanation of cases illustrating
the range of facts on which courts have based the application of equitable estoppel); 22 FLA.
JUR. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 6.
40. For example, as early as 1938, Florida courts applied equitable estoppel in cases involving land use issues. Snedigar v. Keefer, 131 Fla. 191 (1938).
41. See Heeter, supra note 29, at 64-65.
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text (reviewing DRI procedures). Again, this
note ignores the possibility of a constitutionally-based right to continue development. See generally Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 29.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1991). Specifically, the section states that
[i]f a developer has by his actions in reliance on prior regulations, obtained vested
or other legal rights that in law would have prevented a local government from
changing those regulations in a way adverse to his interests, nothing in this chapter
authorizes any governmental agency to abridge those rights.
Id.
45. Gulf Stream Dev. Corp., 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1018 (No. 88-DS-2, Dep't of Community
Affairs) (Sept. 19, 1988).
46. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15) (1991).
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Effect of Section 380.06 on the Dichotomy Between
Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights

1. Tightening Governmental Control Over When Rights Vest
Both equitable estoppel and vested rights prevent a government
from interfering with the progress of a development. If rights vest
when equitable estoppel applies, then the terms are interchangeable.
Overall, though, the DRI procedures seem to contemplate eliminating equitable estoppel from the DRI framework. An examination of
the vested rights provision of section 380.06(20) supports this statement. That provision states:
[n]othing ... shall limit or modify the rights of any person
to complete any development that has been authorized by
registration of a subdivision pursuant to Chapter 498, by
recordation pursuant to local subdivision plat law, or by a
building permit or other authorizationto commence development on which there has been reliance and a change of position and which registration or recordation was accomplished
or which permit or authorization was issued, prior to July
1, 1973. 7
"Reliance" and "change of position" after "or other authorization" directly refer to the elements of equitable estoppel. Thus, even though
section 380.06 recognizes the existence of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, the section limited the applicability to governmental acts
prior to July 1, 1973. The legislature thus attempted to cut off all
estoppel-based rights to develop property that might have arisen after
the passage of the Act.
The second sentence of the section 380.06(20) provision provides
further proof of the legislation's intent to preclude equitable estoppel.
That sentence addresses a developer's changes of position based on
subsequent regulatory changes in legal, not equitable, terms. 48 The
sentence states:
If a developer has, by his actions in reliance on prior regulations, obtained vested or other legal rights that in law
would have prevented a local government from changing

47. Id. § 380.06(20) (emphasis added).
48. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (pointing out difference in theories behind
equitable estoppel and vested rights).
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these regulations in a way adverse to his interests, nothing
in this chapter authorizes any government agency to abridge
those rights. 49
At this juncture, the importance of the difference between the equitable basis of equitable estoppel and the legal basis of vested rights
becomes clearA" The legislature refers specifically to "vested" and
"other legal" rights in the statute. Vested rights result from compliance with the statutory framework;s1 the reference to "vested
rights" means rights obtained under a final development order issued
by the local government. 2 Because equitable estoppel is based on
equity, not law, the reference to "other legal rights" cannot include
equitable estoppel. Therefore, the statute seems to pointedly exclude
any claim of development rights based on equitable estoppel.
Early interpretations by the Attorney General of Florida agreed
with the above conclusions. These interpretations held that mere substantial compliance with the requirements of section 380.06 does not
cause rights to vest in a DRI development. Responding to a series of
questions regarding a phosphate mining operation, the Florida Attorney General stated:
Unless an applicant is exempt under section 380.06(12),
F.S.,r the applicant must comply with the requirements of
Ch. 380, F.S. There are no references, direct or implied, for
the proposition that substantial compliance with any other
regulation would exempt a developer from complying with
the formal permitting procedures. Nor have I found any case
law to support the doctrine of substantial compliance. Therefore, it is my opinion that the doctrine is inapplicable. 5
Taken together, the statutory provisions and Attorney General's interpretations arguably close the door on equitable estoppel. Furthermore, section 380.06 restricts the period during which rights vest for
a DRI project.r Therefore, the terms "equitable estoppel" and "vested

49.
50.

FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1991) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.

51.

Id.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1991) (as amended).
Mining operations are DRIs. See supra note 4.
FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1991) (as amended).
76 Op. Att'y Gen. 97 (1976).
FLA. STAT. § 380.06(5)(a)(1) (1991) (stating that development must be approved under

§ 380.06; establishing specific and rigid criteria for evaluating proposals).
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rights" are no longer properly interchangeable in the DRI context.
Other provisions of section 380.06 support this result.
For example, preliminary development agreements 57 control the
interaction between -developers and local governments. Controlling
interaction tends to limit the number of opportunities on which a
developer could assert equitable estoppel. Moreover, the preliminary
development agreement provision specifically bars equitable estoppel.The provision states that "developers and owners of land may not
claim vested rights, or assert equitable estoppel, arising from the [preliminary development] agreement on any expenditures or actions taken
in reliance on the [preliminary development] agreement to continue
'59
with proposed development beyond the preliminary development.
The statute also prohibits a developer from asserting equitable estoppel based on a preliminary development agreement in order to obtain
a final development order ° Thus, section 380.06 excludes reliance on
acts of government prior to final approval by a local government.
Because reliance is impossible, the statute effectively excludes equitable estoppel.
The mandatory nature of section 380.06 further strengthens control
by local governments. Developers cannot simply ignore section 380.06
and hope that equitable estoppel will give them a right to complete
their projects. In General Development Corp. v. Division of State
Planning,the First District Court of Appeal stated that "[a] developer
who bypasses section 380.06 supervision of its development of regional
impact does so at its own peril and, notwithstanding local government
zoning and building permits, the developer may be enjoined during
construction.61 One problem pointed out in General Development is
the importance placed on a binding letter of interpretation from DCA.
A developer might argue that the letter itself is an act of government
on which the developer could rely.62 If this argument succeeded, the
developer could use reliance on a binding letter of interpretation as
a way to escape further DRI review. However, in Peterson v. Florida

57. Id. § 380.06(8).
58. Id. § 380.06(8)(a)(6).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 353 So. 2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977); see also Frith, supra note 1. This article
provides a good overview and detailed analysis of the DRI procedure in Florida. Much of the
textual discussion on basic DRL procedures and practice is indebted to the Frith article. But
see infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text (court denies application of equitable estoppel yet

refuses to enjoin construction).
62.

See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/4

12

Bentley: Effects of Equitable Estoppel and Substantial Deviations to Veste
VESTED RIGHTS IN DRI PROJECTS

Departmentof Community Affairs, the First District Court of Appeal

rejected this argument, stating that "[t]he Department's binding letter
...is not

even a permit or a license to begin construction." 63 Moreover,

the letter "does not insulate the developer from the jurisdiction or
64
permitting requirements of other federal, state or local agencies."

Thus, section 380.06 compels a developer to comply with DRI procedures.
2. DRI Provisions and the Red Flag Doctrine
Despite the above language, Florida's recognition of the red flag

doctrine removes any grounds for reasonable reliance by a developer
prior to final approval. Whether the red flag doctrine includes or
excludes equitable estoppel from the DRI framework parallels the
broader argument over the place of equitable estoppel after the Growth
Management Act of 1985. 65 On one hand, some commentators" point
out that the growth management statutes do not adopt a public policy
position against equitable estoppel. 67 Therefore, under normal statutory construction, equitable estoppel survives because the growth management statutes do not exclude it." This note discusses this view
earlier, and that discussion will not be repeated here.69

63. 386 So. 2d 879, 880-81 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980). The binding letter provision in this case
was based on FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9)(a) (1977). Id. The current § 380.06(9)(a) is substantially
similar to the 1977 provision. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9)(a) (1991). The changes made to this
provision subsequent to the Petersondecision relate to the form of the request, id. § 380.06(4)(d),
the ability of the local government to require a binding letter, id. § 380.06(4)(b), and the actual
numerical thresholds that DCA uses in its determination, id. § 380.06(4)(b)(1)-(2). Also, local
governments have an added power to require developments in jurisdictions adjacent to the
development in question to obtain a binding letter of interpretation. Id. § 380.06(4)(c).
64. Peterson, 386 So. 2d at 881; accord Orlando Cent. Park, Inc., 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
944 (No. 89-DS-9A, Dep't of Community Affairs) (Mar. 26, 1990) (holding binding letter not a
substitute for final local development order).
65. See supra note 37.
66. See Goodette & Coleman, supra note 37.
67. Id.
68. For example, one court stated that "Itihe doctrine of equitable estoppel is deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence and should not be abrogated except by specific legislative mandate."
Yorke v. Noble, 466 So. 2d 349, 351 (4th D.C.A. 1985), approved, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1986).
In approving this result, the Florida Supreme Court stated that "absent specific statutory
provision, there is no rule of law which in general exempts statutory rights and defenses from
the operation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Significantly, the statute neither expressly
disallows application of the doctrine nor contains language suggesting such a result." Yorke,
490 So. 2d at 31. This reasoning could be very important in the DRI setting. For instance, the
provisions for preliminary development agreements specifically disallow the application of the
doctrine. See supra notes 28, 59-60 and accompanying text. However, the provisions for preap-
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On the other hand Florida recognizes a doctrine known as the "red
flag" doctrine.70 This doctrine precludes the application of equitable
estoppel. Basically, the red flag doctrine holds that if a developer has
notice that the "official mind" might change, reliance on governmental
action is inappropriate. 71 At its broadest, this doctrine could mean
that any reliance on a governmental act is unreasonable. Although
the Florida Supreme Court has retreated from this view of the doctrine,- it is still an effective bar to equitable estoppel.
The red flag doctrine arguably excludes equitable estoppel from
any application to acts of local government prior to final approval in
the DRI approval process. The argument is that the statutory procedures make clear that construction cannot commence until a project
receives final governmental approval.h Accordingly, the developer has
notice that the official mind might change. In fact, the official mind
has not been made up at all; therefore, the local government has not
given a developer any act or decision on which a developer could rely.
Thus, equitable estoppel is inappropriate. If the local government is
unwilling to grant anything less than absolute approval, the developer
proceeds at his or her own risk. The developer cannot claim the protection of equity. Under this analysis, the red flag doctrine might be
a powerful argument against the assertion of equitable estoppel. But
as we will see, the theoretical exclusion of equitable estoppel from
the DRI framework and actual DRI practice do not necessarily converge.

plication procedures do not explicitly exclude equitable estoppel. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7) (1991).
Therefore, equitable estoppel is arguably included. Conceptual agency review provisions definitely include equitable estoppel. The question that remains, though, is how far this estoppel
will reach. Does it allow construction to be completed? Or does it apply only to the issues
presented to the conceptual review agency? A final note here is that courts support the application
as being in line with the intent of the legislature. See Yorke, 490 So. 2d at 31. Therefore, if
legislative history or other documents are found which suggest that equitable estoppel should
be excluded, then these general tenets might not apply. See generally supra note 37.
69. See supra notes 37, 68 and accompanying text.
70. An exposition of the development of the red flag doctrine is beyond the scope of this
note. Moreover, its history and purpose is well-covered elsewhere. See Jaslow, supra note 29,
at 189-95.
71. See id. at 189-90.
72. See id. at 190, 192-95 (providing citations and explanations of cases chronicling the
course of restriction of the red flag doctrine).
73. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 12840 and accompanying
text.
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3.

Reopening the Door for Equitable Estoppel

Although the intent of section 380.06 to exclude equitable estoppel
seems clear enough in general, other provisions of section 380.06 make
this conclusion suspect. For instance, although the provision for preliminary development agreements specifically excludes equitable estoppel, 74 later provisions of the same statute specifically include equitable
estoppel. The conceptual agency review provisions 75 state that
"[n]othing contained in this section shall modify or abridge the law of
vested rights or estoppel." 76 Thus, the statute both includes and
excludes equitable estoppel.7
Further confusion exists because the provision for preapplication
procedures neither prohibits nor allows the assertion of equitable estoppel.78 Because courts generally consider statutory rights to be an
addition to common-law rights unless specifically excluded by the statute, the operating provisions of the statute arguably do not exclude
equitable estoppel. 79 As a result, developers may argue that because
the statute does not exclude equitable estoppel, it should survive into
the statute. 0
A response to this argument is that despite the statute's failure
to specifically exclude equitable estoppel, the local government clearly
has the final decision on whether or not to approve a project.s, The
DRI process does not extend a "welcome mat" to the developer until
the local government makes its final decision 2 One counterargument
is that, in real life, a DRI may require a change in existing zoning
before submitting the DRI application to the local government. If
changes are made, the developer can then argue reasonable reliance

74. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(a)(6) (1991).
75. Id. § 380.06(9); see supra note 68.
76. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9) (1991).
77. The result of this vagueness is that the statute arguably includes equitable estoppel.
See supra notes 37, 68.
78. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7) (1991); see supra note 28.
79. General rules of statutory construction include common law provisions unless explicitly
excluded. See supra note 37.
80. The argument is that the Growth Management Act does not exclude equitable estoppel
and that, in any event, equitable estoppel is too ingrained in our jurisprudence to be lightly
discarded. See supra notes 37, 68.
81. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15) (1991). See generally infra notes 125-36 and accompanying
text.
82. This position, that a "welcome mat" is not extended until final approval, is clear in the
provisions for preliminary development agreements. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text.
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on the changed zoning. Section 380.06 eliminates this argument by
allowing changes to zoning laws and approval of the project to be
brought simultaneously.83 Thus, an action for equitable estoppel cannot
arise until rights vest pursuant to section 380.06.
This result seems justified by the careful structuring of the DRI
approval process under section 380.06. Of course, after a developer
has a vested right to complete the project, the need for the doctrine
of equitable estoppel disappears. Therefore, section 380.06 arguably
excludes equitable estoppel from the DRI process entirely. As conclusive as this response seems, it does not answer the question of what
happens when there is bad faith by the local government. In addition,
it does not necessarily answer the question of whether equitable estoppel applies absent bad faith by the local government. The following
subsections discuss these issues at length.
C.

Bad Faith by Local Government and Equitable Estoppel

The section 380.06 exclusion of equitable estoppel creates a more
significant problem: how will courts respond to abuses by the governmental authority? If courts use equitable estoppel to overcome
abuses by local govermnent, will they effectively redefine equitable
estoppel to include only fraud or other acts of bad faith on the part
of the government? If equitable estoppel is not used, have the rights
and expectations of landowners become severely threatened? Answers
to these questions might also come from civil rights legislation or
takings jurisprudence. However, this note explores only the use of
equitable estoppel as a solution to these questions.
The operating assumption of this section is that a local government
might, in the course of a DRI approval process, deliberately delay
approval in order to pass new ordinances applicable to the project. A
good example of this type of behavior appears in the recent actions
of the City of Margate in City of Margate v. Amoco Oil Co., In that
case, the city illegally denied a permit to build a service station. In
the time before a scheduled rezoning hearing, the city passed several
ordinances eliminating service stations from the area in question.s

83. FLA. STAT. § 163.3187(L)(b) (1991); see supra note 23.
84. 546 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989).
85. Id. at 1093.
86. Id. What the city did was to define "service stations" and "filling stations" as the same
entity. Id. Before the change, the applicant's business would have been a "service station" and
not subject to the restrictions placed on 'Tilling stations." Id. at 1092. Service stations only sold
gasoline, whereas filling stations also did minor repair work and supplied equipment. Id. Because
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The developer sued to enjoin the city from applying the new ordinances
to the developer's rezoning application.8 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal agreed with the developer, stating that "[w]here a governmental body acts arbitrarily to avoid its duty by delaying the
matter so as to effectuate a change in the law adverse to the application, it is proper for the court to disregard the newly enacted limitations. ' I Therefore, the court recognized legislative bad faith as
grounds for the assertion of equitable estoppel.
9
Pre-authorization bad faith also occurred in Dade County v. Jason.8
In that case, a local government approved a building permit and
notified the developers that they could pick up the permit and pay
the necessary fees.9° Although the developers promptly went to the
clerk's office to make the required payments, the clerk delayed issuing
the approved permit until after noon on the day the permit was to
have issued. 91 The clerk's purpose in delay was to allow a building
moratorium, passed after the approval of the developer's permit, to
become effective.2 After the moratorium became effective at noon,
the clerk denied the permit.93 The Third District Court of Appeal
ordered the county to issue the permit, stating that "because of the
obvious conclusion . . . that the county had acted in bad faith in
delaying the issuance of the permit . . . the applicant should have
been entitled to a permit." 94 Thus, courts also recognize administrative
bad faith as grounds for the assertion of equitable estoppel.
The cases above do not deal with bad faith in the DRI process
directly. However, the existence of bad faith is as real a possibility
in the DRI process as it is in the above situations. For example, the
RPC could intentionally delay an application for a long period of time
by requesting additional information. 95 Even without bad faith, this

the
the
the
the

zoning in question restricted filling stations by defining service stations as filling stations,
city eliminated the applied-for use without changing the zoning. Id. at 1093. Eventually,
city completely and openly eliminated the applicant's business from the uses permitted in
zone. Id.
87. Id. at 1093.
88. Id. at 1094.
89. 278 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
90. Id.
91. Id. The clerk did not have to hold the permit for very long: the parties stipulated that
the permit should have been issued at 11:30 a.m. on March 29 and the moratorium went into
effect at noon, March 29. Id.
92. Id. at 311-12.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 312 (emphasis in text).
95. See generally FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10)(b) (1991). Under this statute, an RPC has 30
days from the receipt of an application or new information to request additional information.
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delay means expense and burden to a developer.9 Also, multiple revisions of the proposed project are often made. Delays by the RPC give
the local government time to change its comprehensive plan or zoning
laws. Lacking a vested right to develop, the developer must comply
with the new regulations. Courts normally treat the costs incurred as
an extreme but predictable burden on developers. But if the delays
are the result of bad faith, equity should arguably come into play as
it did in the Amoco Oil and Jason cases cited above.Equitable estoppel should probably apply to mitigate acts of bad
faith by local governments. However, focusing solely on issues of bad
faith may effectively redefine equitable estoppel to include only acts
of fraud or bad faith. This definition is much narrower than the traditional notion of acts on which the developer reasonably relied. Although a more narrow definition may be justified for acts prior to a
final development order, it is probably not justified for acts after the
final development order. The following section discusses this point in
more depth.
D.

Application of Equitable Estoppel Absent Bad
Faith by Local Government

Bad faith situations by local government provide the best argument
for allowing equitable estoppel into the DRI statutory framework.
Equitable estoppel provides a quick, efficient means of correcting acts
of bad faith. However, the questions remain: Are there times when
a developer can invoke equitable estoppel absent a showing of bad
faith? What about infringement on a development after final approval?
Is equitable estoppel appropriate or does the vesting procedure make
equitable estoppel superfluous? Will relief be easier to obtain in a
pre-approval situation or post-approval? This last question implies that
the answer to whether equitable estoppel is appropriate may depend
on whether the asserted reliance occurred before or after the final
approval order. The following sections deal with both situations and
conclude that, absent governmental bad faith, allowing equitable estop-

Theoretically, additional requests for information are only for information to clarify old issues
or answer questions raised by the additional information. In practice, though, this rule provides
few effective restraints on additional requests for information. If the developer does not supply
the new information, the application is considered withdrawn 120 days after the request for
information. A little math will show that even a few requests for additional information can
amount to a large amount of time.
96. See infra note 107.
97. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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pel in the DRI context prior to final approval by a local government
is inappropriate. However, equitable estoppel should apply to acts
after final approval in order to preserve a developer's vested rights.
1. Asserting Equitable Estoppel Before Final Development Approval
The applicability of estoppel to local governments is not in dispute.
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
a governmental body as if it were an individual. This doctrine
will preclude a municipality from exercising its police power
to prohibit a particular use of land where: [a] property owner
1) in good faith, 2) upon some act or omission of the government, 3) has made such a substantial change in position or
has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it
would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right
to be acquired. 98
The elements and purposes of equitable estoppel have been discussed previously. 99 Again, the meanings of "good faith," "act or omission of government," and "substantial change" are topics of broadly
differing interpretations. 10 Although the DRI cases have not discussed
these distinctions with much frequency, non-DRI cases involving procedures similar to DRIs have discussed them at length. The following
cases involve both DRI situations and analogous non-DRI situations.
This section will review the facts of each case first. Next, the section
will analogize and compare the case to the DRI situation. Finally, the
case will be critiqued and evaluated.
In Compass Lake Hills Development Corp. v. Division of State
Planning, the court discussed applying equitable estoppel to a DRI
before the developer obtained a final development order.101 In that
case, the parties asked the court to define the types of acts that would
amount to "other authorization to commence development" under the
vested rights provision of section 380.06(12)102 of the Florida Statutes. 10 3 Whether the development was a DRI was not an issue.1°4

98. The Florida Cos. v. Orange County, 422 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
99. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (difference in theories behind equitable
estoppel and vested rights).
100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
101. 379 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979).
102. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 380.06(12) (1980) (as amended 1991).
103. Compass Lake Hills, 379 So. 2d at 377.
104. Id. at 378.
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In Compass Lake Hills, the developer claimed vested rights to a
particular project. 10 5 The developer based the claim on the county
commission's "conceptual approval" of the project and on the commission's approval of Unit 1 of the development. The developer also made
extensive changes to the development plans at the request of the
county. 106Changes to development plans are typical of the DRI process
and, as in this case, can result in large expenditures for the developer. 107 However, the court found that the developer could not
present any evidence that the county commission ever approved a
master plan, or that the developer even submitted a master plan for
approval.- ° According to the court, a master plan is of "critical importance in determining whether the rights had vested; the plan shows
what the developer intends to do with the land and once the development is approved, what he is permitted to do."' 9 Therefore, the court
held that the portions of the project not yet complete were subject
to DRI review under the new ordinances. 110 The court refused, though,
to enjoin the developer from selling lots in the already completed
portions of the project.- In effect, the court reached an equitable
estoppel result while denying the application of equitable estoppel to
DRI situations.
The result in Compass Lake Hills is troubling for two reasons.
First, the use of equity allows a developer to ignore the section 380.06
approval requirements. The Compass Lake Hills court allowed the
developer to sell portions of an unapproved development merely because the portions were substantially complete. This result totally
contradicts the idea of vested rights.1 12 Second, the holding presents
105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107. This case provides a good example of the extent of expenditures that can arise in
preparing a DRI for construction. For instance, the developer in this case spent $135,500 before
1973 on planning, plotting, and surveying alone. Id. From 1973 to 1978, the developer spent
another $660,000 on these activities. Id. These figures do not include the $1,125,000 down
payment made by the developer, or other expenditures made just to acquire the property. Id.
In another case, the developer spent well over $2.5 million prior to approval and was then
denied final approval. Pasco County v. Tampa Dev. Corp., 364 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1978). Other states report egregious examples of expenditures by developers prior to approval
of the project. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976) (developer spent almost $3,000,000 prior
to approval and was losing $7,113.46 a day).
108. Compass Lake Hills, 379 So. 2d at 379.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 379-80.
111. Id. at 381.
112. See infra notes 195-96 (discussing generally accepted principles and goals of zoning
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the possibility of inconsistent and inequitable results. For example, a
developer who complies with DRI review from the beginning does not
have any assurance of getting approval for the project. If the local
government denies the application for approval, the denial bars the
developer from both completing the project and from claiming vested
rights. In contrast, a Compass Lake Hills analysis bars a developer
who blatantly ignores the review procedures from only further expansion of the project; the developer is free to sell the already completed
portions, thus completing the project.
In Compass Lake Hills, the court effectively removed any incentive
a developer might have to comply with the DRI statute. If a developer
ignores DRI review and builds substantial portions of the project,
Compass Lake Hills gives the developer a right to complete the project; namely, to sell the completed portions." 3 Obviously, this result
conflicts with language such as "an applicant must comply with the
requirements of ch. 380," ' 1 4 or that "[a] developer who fails to comply
with chapter 380 should not be rewarded."'1 5 To be faithful to these
statements, and to avoid inconsistent results, the Compass Lake Hills
court should have enjoined the developer from selling the lots in the
already completed portions of the unauthorized development.
Other courts properly deny a claim of equitable estoppel prior to
final approval. The first example is the Peterson case already noted. 116
The second example is Dade County v. United Resources, Inc." 7 Although not a DRI case, significant similarities exist between procedures at issue in that case and the procedures at issue in a regular
DRI review. In fact, the Dade County review procedure practically
mirrors a DRI review."18 Like a DRI review, the Dade County process
begins when a developer submits an approval application to the Dade
County Developmental Impact Committee (DIC). The DIC reviews
the proposal and advises the county commission on how the proposal
will effect the county comprehensive plan, public services, and "other
land use factors.""' 9 In United Resources, the local government gave

113. Compass Lake Hills, 379 So. 2d at 381.
114. Id. at 380 (quoting General Dev. Corp., 353 So. 2d at 1202).
115. Id. at 381.
116. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
117. 374 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
118. See DeGrove & Stroud, New Developments and Future Trends in Local Government
Comprehensive Planning, 17 STET. L. REV. 573, 601 (1988). This article contains citations to
good reference materials for further study of Dade County's Development Impact Committee.
Id. at n.147. See generally supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text.
119. United Resources, 374 So. 2d at 1048.
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the developer an exemption from review under the DRI statute, but
told the developer that future zoning changes might occur. 120 Later,
12 1
the county denied a proposal for rezoning by the developer.
The court upheld denial of the proposed rezoning as a valid use of
the police power. 12 The court pointed out that "zoning resolutions,
like other resolutions, are presumed valid and should not be interfered
with by the courts, unless they are arbitrary and unreasonably applied
to a particular piece of property."'' Because the county gave sufficient
warning to the developers of a possible zoning change, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel did not apply.- The result in this case provides
a more definite vesting time. Absent bad faith by the local government,
a more definite vesting period is probably fairer to both the developers
and local governments.
In Striton Properties v. City of Jacksonville Beach, a non-DRI
case involving community redevelopment agreements, the court also
strictly interpreted "reasonable reliance."' In Striton, reasonable reliance on government action did not occur until the proposal received
final approval by the local government. 126 The First District Court of
Appeal rejected the developer's assertion of vested rights based on
an understanding between the planning agency and the developer
before obtaining final approval from the local government.,- Again,
this case is not a DRI case. As in United Resources, however, there
are significant similarities between the procedures used in Striton and
a regular DRI review.
M

120. Id. at 1048-50.
121. Id. at 1048.
122. Id. at 1051.
123. Id. at 1049. Again, recent trends may undermine this deference to the local government's discretion. See infranote 195 and accompanying text. If DRI approval is an administrative
or executive act, then courts may impose "close judicial review" on the decisions of local governments. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. Thus, stricter review may limit the discretion
of local governments in the DRI context.
124. United Resources, 374 So. 2d at 1051. The rule is that notice to the developer that
final authority has not been given bars any application of equitable estoppel. But cf. supra notes
101-15 and accompanying text (court denied application of equitable estoppel yet refused to
enjoin sale of completed lots); supra note 68 (discussion of equitable estoppel in Florida jurisprudence). A local government might use this rule to bar any application of equitable estoppel
before entering a final development order in the DRI context. Id. But see infra notes 169-73
and accompanying text.
125. 533 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).
126. Id. at 1176-77.
127. Actually, what this case discusses is equitable estoppel, not vested rights. This discussion reflects the way courts interchange the two terms. See supra note 37.
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Like DRIs, community redevelopment agreement procedures require a period of preapplication information gathering. Also like DRIs,
this information gathering process culminated in a development plan. 128

Instead of an RPC, though, the entity in charge of formulating proposals for submission to the local government for approval is the
Community Redevelopment Agency (Agency). 13° In Striton, the developer and the Agency developed a plan for submission to the City
of Jacksonville Beach in accordance with the statute. 3 1 The city subsequently refused to approve the agreement reached by the Agency
and the developer.32
The developer challenged the city's refusal to approve the final
development agreement between the Agency and the developer. The
developer claimed that "considerable time, effort and money"1 had
been spent in preparation of the plan. The developer also asserted
vested rights for the project based on the dealings between the developer and the Agency.2 8 The developer based the claim of vested
rights on a carefully worded Disposition and Development Agreement
approved by the agency.1 However, the court in Striton answered

the challenge stating, in dicta, that it could not
construe the Disposition and Development Agreement, which
represents the culmination of these interactions (between

the agency and the developer) as giving Striton any vested
property rights.... Furthermore, even if we could construe

128. See FLA.STAT. § 163.360 (1991). Under this section, the local government may either
prepare a community redevelopment plan or order one prepared. Id. § 163.360(3). The statute
specifies the contents of this plan and includes identification and location of buildings, open
space, recreation areas, and streets; availability of funding from the public; impacts on traffic,
relocation, environmental quality, services, and schools; and assurances of adequate housing for
displaced persons. Id. § 163.362.
129. FLA.STAT. § 163.360(4) (1991).
130. Id. § 163.356. Although it sounds like a separate entity, it is possible for a governing
body to appoint itself as the community redevelopment agency. Id. § 163.357(1).. Compare these
requirements to those in a DRI plan. See supra note 17. In the community redevelopment
procedures, the governing body expressly reserves the right to grant final approval. FLA. STAT.
§ 163.358(2) (1991). As the Striton court makes clear, the local government cannot give this
power away. See Striton, 533 So. 2d at 1178; see also infra notes 137-41 and accompanying
text. But cf. supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text (substantial completion, even without
a final approval, may allow the application of equitable estoppel).
131. Striton, 533 So. 2d at 1176.
132. Id. at 1177.
133. Id. at 1178.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1177.
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this agreement and the interactions leading up to it as giving
Striton vested property rights, they could not divest the city
of its exclusive power to grant final approval to the community development plan.13s
Thus, the court makes clear that reliance on interactions before final
approval by local government, even if it results in a written agreement,
13 7
will not result in an acquisition of vested rights.
Applying the above analysis to DRIs would restrict the application
of equitable estoppel. According to the Striton court, "statutory provisions make clear that the legislature vested the city with the exclusive authority to grant final approval to any community redevelopment
plan."1 In the DRI setting, this final approval authority rests with
the local government.s 9 In Striton, the court rejected the assertion
that acts by a planning agency could create a right to final approval. 140
The natural result of this reasoning is that a developer should be
aware that, assuming good faith by the local government, regardless
of what a planning review body says or does, the decision to approve
or not to approve ultimately rests with the local government.14 1 In
the DRI setting, the planning agency is the RPC. 42 The local government can always decide against a project because RPC's decision is
not binding.'14 Therefore, any reliance by a developer on the words
or acts of the RPC is unreasonable.-" Because reasonable reliance is
an element of equitable estoppel,1 5 the pre-application procedures

136. Id. at 1178.
137. Again, the importance of this case is that the process involved is nearly identical with
the DRI preapplication procedures. See supra note 28; see also supranotes 74-80 and accompanying text. Compare FLA. STAT. § 163.358 (1991) (local government reserves the right of final
approval) with id. § 380.06(5) (a developer may commence development after approval) and id.
§ 380.06(8)(a)(6) (developer cannot assert equitable estoppel or vested rights based on a preliminary development agreement).
138. Striton, 533 So. 2d at. 1178.
139. See supra notes 20-24, and accompanying text.
140. Striton, 533 So. 2d at 1178-79. See also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text
(cases discussing authority of local governments to make final decisions in context of a binding
letter from DCA).
141. See Striton, 533 So. 2d at 1178. The court stated that 'the Act accorded the City no
power to delegate or divest itself of such authority and accorded the Agency no power to assume
such authority." Id.
142. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
143. Id. But cf. supra note 17; infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing possibility
of closer judicial review of local government decisions).
144. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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wholly exclude the application of equitable estoppel. Absent bad faith
by the local government this bright line rule provides clarity and
consistency to the entire pre-application procedure.
A dissent in Andover Development Corp. v. City of New Smyrna
Beach reflects the above position in the context of Planned Unit Developments (PUDs). 146 In that case, Judge McCord stated that proper
reliance occurs when, and only when, "an applicant has received authority or assurance from the city upon which he should be able to
rely. In the absence thereof, he proceeds at his peril.' ' 147 In the PUD

context, Judge McCord felt that any reliance before a local government
issues a building permit is unreasonable.'4 Analogously, good faith
reliance in the DRI context will not occur until a local government
issues a final development order. Absent good faith reliance, the
amount expended by the developer is irrelevant. 14 Therefore, extreme
expenditures of money prior to obtaining a final development order
is an improper basis for the assertion of equity.
Smith v. City of Clearwaterechoes Judge McCord's reasoning. 5°
In that case, a question arose whether the development was a DRI. 15'
By the time the developer resolved this issue, the city had changed
its zoning, making the property "for all practical purposes, undevelopable.'

52

The developer argued that equitable estoppel should bar the

city from applying the new ordinances to the property.' Both the
trial court and the appellate court rejected this argument. The Second
District Court of Appeal stated that the "most the city did was engage
in a little 'foot dragging. '', 4 The city did not make any affirmative

146. 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
147. Id. at 239.
148. Id.; see Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 29, at 482-84 (explaining proper time for vesting
and providing citations to sources discussing this issue).
149. See, e.g., Gross v. City of Riviera Beach, 367 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979)
(Developer expended over $1,000,000 to develop the property, but relief was denied due to lack
of good faith by the developer. Court admits that it was a "harsh and expensive result...
[but]... acknowledges that it could have been avoided."); Pasco County v. Tampa Dev. Corp.,
364 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978) (developer spent well over $2.5 million prior to
approval then was denied local government approval); Jaslow, supra note 29, at 189-200, 221-23
(case citations and discussion); supra note 107 (additional examnples).
150. 383 So. 2d 681 (2d D.C.A. 1980), rev. denied, 403 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1981).
151. Id. at 684.
152. Id. at 683-84.
153. Id. at 685. The developer also argued that the zoning change was void as capricious,
arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory. Id. at 684. A third argument was that the change in
zoning constituted a taking. Id. at 685.
154. Id. at 686. Cf. supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing different result
where the actions of local government were in bad faith).
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act of encouragement or approval. The court pointed out that "mere
thoughts or comments by city employees concerning the desirability
of a change are not enough. There must be active and documented
efforts on the part of those authorized to do the work which in the
normal course of municipal action, culminate in the requisite zoning
change."'-, Again, the conclusion is that a designated body exists on
whom the developer is to exclusively rely for approval. Absent final
approval or bad faith action by this body prior to final approval, a
developer's reliance is unreasonable, and equitable estoppel should not
apply.
However, the absolutist position of the cases above is not the
universal view. In The FloridaCos. v. Orange County, Florida,Judge
Cowart asserted that the "[a]pplication of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel does not depend on an absolute, binding, final approval from
the governmental body."15 In contrast to the argument accepted in
Smith, the court in The Florida Cos. held that estoppel barred the
county from denying approval of a subdivision plan 157 because of substantial expenditures made in reliance on a preliminary approval of
the project.1 5This is a classic equitable estoppel rationale. However,
Smith and The Florida Cos. are not necessarily inconsistent, and the
reconciling analysis is extremely important. In Smith, the court looked
for but did not find specific acts or conditions which, if fulfilled, would
lead directly to a final approval. 159 In The FloridaCos., the court found
that the preliminary approval would lead to a final approval if the
developer met the conditions in the preliminary approval.160 Because
meeting the conditions would lead to final approval, imposing new
restrictions on the project before the developer had an opportunity
to meet those conditions was inequitable.'6'
The important point of The Florida Cos. is that the conditional
approval obtained by a developer led directly to final approval by the
governmental body exclusively authorized to approve developments.
The court viewed the local government's approval as final despite its
conditional nature. The court in The Florida Cos. was only holding
the governmental body to its prior approval. Arguably, the Smith

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Smith, 383 So. 2d at 689.
411 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Smith, 383 So. 2d at 686.
The FloridaCos., 411 So. 2d at 1012.
Id.
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court also sought evidence of conditional but final approval when it
searched for "active and documented efforts" on the part of the government to approve the project. 162 If so, then the analysis both courts
employed is the same: both required some sort of final approval, even
with conditions, by the proper governmental body. In The Florida
Cos., the court found the necessary approval, in Smith it did not.
2. Asserting Equitable Estoppel After Final Development Approval
Assuming that a developer cannot assert equitable estoppel prior
to receiving a final development order, can equitable estoppel apply
to the interaction between local government and developers after the
final development order issues? Specifically, will a conditional approval
of a DRI rather than an absolute approval or denial, reopen the door
for equitable estoppel? Under section 380.06(20), this question might
seem moot. After all, after the final development order issues, rights
to complete the project vest.'6 However, conditional approval undermines the conclusiveness of the vesting. A developer could argue that
the conditional approval of a DRI plan does, in fact, amount to a final
approval for vested rights purposes. If the developer satisfies the
imposed conditions, then the local government cannot impose further
requirements. A hypothetical illustrates some problems that may arise.
Suppose that a local government issues a final development order.
Subsequently, the state imposes, and the local government adopts,

162. Smith, 383 So. 2d at 689. Another case where a local government was equitably
estopped was Board of County Comm'rs v. Lutz, 314 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975). The
interesting part of that case was an assertion by the court that might have a great impact on
the question of whether equitable estoppel applies in the DRI framework. The court said in
dicta that "fiun a day and age when governmental restrictions and requirements pertaining to
land development are extraordinarily extensive and zoning classifications allowing development
are granted grudgingly and often after exhaustive efforts by a developer, government may not
casually ignore the individual landowner's rights when formulating large-scale zoning plans."
Id. at 816. DRI review procedures are certainly extensive and difficult. If this statement were
followed, then equitable estoppel would seem to be clearly applicable to the DRI setting. But
see City of Parkland v. Septimus, 428 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983). In that case the court
stated that "[k]eeping in mind that we are dealing with an exercise of the police power of the
government in planning and zoning the future use of property, we think the use of equitable
estoppel should be cautiously invoked." Id. at 683.
163. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8) (1991). It is important to remember that vested rights and
equitable estoppel spring from two different sources. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text. Several of the ideas that follow in the text were developed, in part, through conversation
with Michael Win. Morrell, a Tallahassee land use attorney. Also, Eden Bentley, an assistant
county attorney in Brevard County and a certified real estate attorney, acted as a sounding
board for many of these ideas and was instrumental in their development. I would like to
acknowledge my gratitude to both of these individuals.
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concurrency requirements. I- The local government then takes the position that the new requirements bar the county from issuing further
permits until the development meets the new requirements.16 The
simplest and arguably fairest answer is that the project's rights are
vested because the local government issued the final development
order before the state imposed new requirements. Because the DRI
statute protects vested rights, the issue of equitable estoppel should
never come up. The developer may complete the project without having to prove the elements of a government act or omission, good faith
reliance, or change of position.
The answer above is the one a court would most likely reach based
on a quick reading of section 380.06. If a local government gave broad
and conclusive approval, this conclusion would probably be correct.
However, here, as in many areas, the practice undermines the theory.
In practice, many development orders are not, in fact, absolute approvals. Development orders often include conditional clauses reserving
the local government's right to impose later restrictions. 16 A local
government might try to characterize this approval as nonfinal.67 If
the development order is nonfinal, the developer's rights do not vest.
Even if the local government classifies the development order as final,

164. Actually, the term "concurrency" does not appear in the Florida Statutes. What does
appear are requirements that needed facilities be provided "concurrent with the impacts of such
development." FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h) (1991).
165. This situation occurred recently in Citizens for Responsible Growth of the Treasure
Coast, Inc. v. Martin County, No. 89-935-CA (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. Nov. 1, 1991) (non-final
decision). In that case, the county asserted that concurrency requirements did not apply to the
DRI project because the DRI only received a conditional development approval. Id. The county
argued that concurrency requirements only apply to the final development order. Id. The court
rejected this assertion. Id. Judge Fennelly stated that "[t]he statute clearly distinguishes between
development orders and development. Both are required to be consistent with an approved
comprehensive plan. Indeed, the statute unequivocally mandates that all actions to development
orders be consistent with the plan. F.S. 163.3194(a)." Id. (emphasis in original).
The significance of this decision is that it arguably nullifies the whole provision for vested
rights in FLA. STAT. § 380.06. The court stated that it "rejected the County's argument that
development order [sic] is only provisional approval and that the restrictions in final site approval
are sufficient to comply with the Act and the Plan." Id. If the court means that concurrency
requirements apply up until the final development order issues, it may be correct. See supra
notes 117-55 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. However, the court could mean that the approval was merely a provisional order. If so, the court
effectively imposed new obligations on a developer after a local government issued a final
development order. Therefore, the ruling severely jeopardizes the efficacy of the DRI vesting
provisions.
166. This practice is recognized by the statute. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(14) (1991).
167. See supra note 165.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/4

28

Bentley: Effects of Equitable Estoppel and Substantial Deviations to Veste
VESTED RIGHTS IN DRI PROJECTS

the order might omit provisions for subsequently enacted elements of
the applicable comprehensive plan. If so, the local government might
attempt to impose further obligations on the developer. 1' Imposing
further obligations on the developer stands in direct conflict with the
doctrine of legally vested rights. If the DRI vesting provisions do not
protect a developer from further obligations, then equitable estoppel
is the developer's only hope for protection. In either situation, the
developer's rights are not vested. Therefore, by approving a development order with open-ended conditions, local governments reopen the
door for equitable estoppel.
The hypothetical concludes that if the local government refuses to
allow further development after the developer meets the conditions
of a development order, the developer might assert equitable estoppel.
This is exactly what happened in The FloridaCos. case, in which the
Fifth District Court of Appeal found that the local government granted
a preliminary approval with conditions.169 The developer substantially
completed construction before the county disapproved of a new plat.170
The county contended that the developer lacked the good faith element
of estoppel because the county had not approved any final plans on
which the developer could rely.17, The court though, stated that "[t]he
fact that the expenditures were made upon preliminary approval,
rather than final approval, would likewise not effect the application
of estoppel.172 Following this reasoning, the court concluded that by
granting the preliminary approval with conditions the county implied
that after the developer met the conditions, the county could not
interfere further.173
Citing The FloridaCos. case, developers could argue that if a DRI
development receives a conditional approval, this approval secures
development rights as long as the developer fulfills the conditions.
This argument assumes that the conditions cannot be so open-ended
that they make vesting meaningless. Even if the developer does not
fulfill the conditions, the conditional approval arguably is an act of
government on which it is reasonable for the developer to rely. Therefore, the developer might use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
The FloridaCos., 411 So. 2d at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
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bar a local government from making inequitable restrictions on the
developer. '74
On its face, this estoppel argument resembles a traditional vesting
argument. Despite some overlap, the two doctrines are still distinct.
In the hypotheticals above, conditional approval of DRIs undermines
the finality of the development order. Therefore, the legal, or vested,
status of the development is in question. Although this legal question
depends on the specific facts of the case, applying equitable estoppel
would protect the landowner's rights regardless of the outcome of the
vested rights issue. Thus, equitable estoppel should be used to correct
the infirmities in DRI vesting procedure created by conditional development approval.
E.

Conclusions

Whether the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel survives
into the DRI framework is a debatable issue. Whether the doctrine
applies before or after a development order issues is also a debatable
issue. In fact, what constitutes a final development order sufficient
to vest a DRI's development rights is a debatable issue. The statutory
language may or may not contemplate exclusion of equitable estoppel.
Although the statute seems to exclude equitable estoppel, traditional
arguments weigh in favor of preserving the common law unless clearly
abrogated. Even if the statute does exclude equitable estoppel prior
to final government action, conditional approval of a project may allow
a developer to assert equitable estoppel against subsequent actions
by a local government. At the same time, the practical aspects of the
DRI procedure may make a developer's reliance on local government
action prior to an unconditional final approval unreasonable and the
red flag doctrine could bar the assertion equitable estoppel.
Given all this doctrinal confusion, the cases naturally disagree as
to whether equitable estoppel is appropriate. The legal and equitable
foundations of vested rights versus equitable estoppel are already
hopelessly intertwined. Also, emerging constitutional attacks on land

174. Although not used in that case, this argument might also have applied in Citizens for
Responsible Growth. However, the court in that case did not clearly classify the local government's approval as a final or only a preliminary order. Citizens for Responsible Growth, No.
89-935-CA. If preliminary, the case conflicts with The FloridaCos. In Citizensfor Responsible
Growth, the court did not allow preliminary approval to bar the local government from subsequently restricting the developer. Id. In The FloridaCos., the court held the local government
to its preliminary approval. 411 So. 2d at 1012. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
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use regulations are sure to confuse the area even more. 175 Moreover,
and most importantly, other land use control measures fully and more
effectively incorporate the goals of the DRI process. This incorporation
of DRI planning goals into other land use control measures (discussed
in more depth below) combined with the existing confusion over vested
rights leads to only one conclusion: DRIs should be eliminated, and
extralocal planning accomplished by other means.
Initially, DRIs were designed to operate as mini-laboratories for
comprehensive planning requirements. The Growth Management Act
now imposes these requirements on all developments across the board,
statewide. Local government comprehensive plans generally include
the same goals and elements as the DRI provisions.176 Thus, having
different vesting procedures for different developments based solely
on the size or nature of the project is illogical. In some cases, the
difference may also be inequitable. Moreover, a vested DRI may become a gigantic, nonconforming use over which local governments will
have little control. Therefore, to continue separate, extralocal control
of DRIs is redundant, and possibly even counterproductive.
The inequities between landowners caused by the DRI statute is
one reason the separate control of DRIs should be eliminated. Loss
of local government control over the nonconforming use is another.
Except when a new peril'7 to health or safety occurs, the local government loses control over large portions of a development, if not the
whole thing, when it vests. A local government is able to subject

175. See generally Smolker & Weaver, Implementing and Coping with Concurrency: The
Legal Framework and Emerging ConstitutionalIssues, 64 FLA- B.J. 47 (May 1990) (discussing
concurrency in Florida); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 60 U.S.L.W. 4843 (June 29,
1992) (discussing the possibility of a taking caused by state coastal protection laws).

176. If the local government plans are not already this detailed, they may soon be. At least
one district court of appeal now imposes close judicial review on rezoning decisions by local
governments. See Snyder v. Brevard County Bd. of Comn'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1991). Local governments may respond by making their comprehensive plan much more detailed.
This would avoid judicial oversight but may also reduce the flexibility of the local governments
to respond to changing needs. Additionally, more detailed comprehensive plans mean more
expense for any developer or person seeking a modification.
177. The new peril exception essentially says that a government can restrict the rights of
a landowner if there is a sufficiently compelling threat to health, safety, or welfare of the general

public that occurred after the act or omission by the government. See Hollywood Beach Hotel
Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 16 (Fla. 1976) (citing City of Hollywood v. Hollywood
Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973)). The local government can restrict
these rights despite a good faith reliance by the landowner on the act or omission of the

government. See id. Again, though, the history and impact of the new peril exception is beyond
the scope of this note and is well covered elsewhere. See generally Jaslow, supra note 29, at
224-26.
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smaller developments to much greater scrutiny. Thus, the loss of
governmental control, because it occurs in the DRI setting, occurs
only with the largest developments. The combination of these effects
results in extreme inequities between landowners.
An example may serve to illustrate this point. On one hand, a local
government may require a development of moderate size, not vested
as a DRI, to comply with concurrency requirements after the state
enacts such requirements. A developer of a DRI, on the other hand,
might escape such requirements by claiming that rights to complete
the project vested when the local government issued the final development order. The local government then faces the difficult choice of
issuing what would otherwise be illegal permits to a vested development or of denying the permits and facing an equitable estoppel argument or even a takings claim.
Obviously, this situation does not "further the goals of the comprehensive plan."' 17 Placing conditions or reservations on a final development order will not avoid this result because equitable estoppel
could bar all inequitable restrictions by the government, except those
resulting from a new peril. 179 Also, basing development approval on
a condition allowing application of any subsequently enacted statute
completely contradicts the idea of vested rights. Vested rights exist
to protect a development from subsequently enacted laws. Therefore,
conditional approval does not protect the landowner, is contrary to
the idea of vested rights and is probably ineffective anyway. A comprehensive plan can achieve all of its goals and protect the expenditures
of developers without such an extreme loss of control by the local
government. Given this situation, a separate procedure applying only
to the largest developments is inefficient, conceptually misplaced, and
should be eliminated.
If DRI provisions are not eliminated, then the vesting issue needs
resolution. Part of the statute already provides the answer. The preliminary development agreements section explicitly excludes the application of equitable estoppel based on the preliminary development
agreement.'8 The DRI preapplication procedure provision should include this exclusionary provision. At the same time, the vesting provision should bar local government from issuing conditional approvals

178. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(a) (1991) (phrase used in this context to define consistency,
but appears elsewhere in the statute).
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. But see supra note 165 (conditions imposed
after an approval by the local government).
180. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(a)(6) (1991); see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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subject to subsequently enacted rules or restrictions. Such a provision
would set out clearly the point at which the developer can, in good
faith, rely on actions of the government. 18' It also avoids the possibility
that a developer could acquire development rights before a local government gives final approval. Developers would also know with certainty that their development rights vested at that point. The disadvantage of a provision excluding equitable estoppel is that it does not
eliminate the nonconforming use problem created by a vested project.
However, reducing the use of equitable estoppel to gain development
rights for otherwise disapproved projects probably outweighs the problem of nonconforming uses. All in all, though, the combination of
continued nonconforming uses, unequal treatment of similarly situated
landowners, and local government's loss of ability to implement its
comprehensive plan mandates elimination of separate, extralocal review of DRIs.
III.

Do CURRENT STANDARDS OF EVALUATING
SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATIONS IN VESTED DRI PROJECTS
CONFLICT WITH EMERGING IDEAS OF CONSISTENCY
WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN?

A.

The Current SubstantialDeviation Standards

A project receives a right to continue as a DRI either by obtaining
vested rights under section 380.06, or by the application of equitable
estoppel. After a project receives a right to continue development as
a DRI, it is generally allowed to proceed until completion. Often,
though, development plans undergo changes during construction. Section 380.06 provides for changes to vested projects in a separate subsection for substantial deviations. 18
This section provides a framework for evaluating the kinds of
changes that cause a DRI to lose vested status. These changes include,
among others, impacts not previously reviewed.lm Also included are
uses that result in an increase in intensity of use above a designated
level. 14 In fact, the statute deems changes resulting in decreased
intensity of use as insubstantial deviations, stating that if "any proposed substantial change concerning which rights had previously yes-

181. This logic carries over into the non-DRI setting as well. If FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8)
(1991) defined "final local development order," then developers would have a much clearer idea
of when they could rely on the actions of the local government. See supra note 37.
182. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(19) (1991).
183. Id. § 380.06(19)(a).
184. Id. § 380.06(19)(b)(1)-(16).
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ted pursuant to [380.06(20)] would result in reduced regional impacts,
the change shall not divest rights to complete the development pursuant to [380.06(20)]." ' s Although this position seems like a reasonable,
even admirable, goal, in practice it is counterproductive, possibly
damaging to community goals, and totally contrary to the idea of
consistency with a comprehensive plan.
B.

Problems with the Current SubstantialDeviation Standards

The first problem with barring increased use but not decreased
use is that it violates the idea of consistency with a comprehensive
plan. Specifically, allowing unilateral decreases in use may be counterproductive to the policies and goals of the comprehensive plan. Second,
allowing decreased but not increased use violates the state comprehensive plan. 1 Both these issues will be discussed below.
1. Contradiction with Consistency Requirements in Comprehensive Plans
Consistency is a required part of the comprehensive planning system. Under chapter 163, "[a]fter a comprehensive plan ... has been
adopted . . . all development undertaken by, and all actions taken in
regard to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to
land covered by such plan or element shall be consistent with such a
plan.' ' 8 Also, "[aill land development regulations enacted or amended
shall be consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan."las The legislature added a definition of "consistent" in 1985,189 explaining that
[a] development order or land development regulation shall
be consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses
densities or intensities, and other aspects of the development

185. Id. § 380.06(4)(f).
186. In Florida, unlike any other state with the exception of Hawaii, the state statutes
fully adopt the state comprehensive plan. Id. ch. 187. The plan breaks down into sections
consisting of a goal statement followed by a list of specific policy aims. Id. The state goals
address education, children, families, the elderly, housing, health, public safety, water resources,
coastal and marine resources, natural systems and recreational lands, air quality, energy, hazardous and non-hazardous materials and waste, mining, property rights, land use, downtown revitalization, public facilities, cultural and historic resources, transportation, government efficiency,
the economy, agriculture, tourism, employment, and plan implementation. Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1)(a) (1991).
188. Id. § 163.3194(1)(b).
189. Another definition was added in 1986 to help determine whether local government
comprehensive plans are consistent with the state comprehensive plan. Id. § 163.3177(10)(a).
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permitted by such an order or regulation are compatible with
and further the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities
or intensities in the comprehensive plan. 1'
However, further explanation mitigates this language to some degree:
"[it is the intent of this Act that the comprehensive plan set general

guidelines and principles concerning its purposes and contents and
that this Act shall be construed broadly to accomplish its stated purposes and objectives." 191 To characterize a plan containing such strict
requirements as "general" is somewhat contradictory. This language
undermines the otherwise mandatory nature of the Act.
Courts have split over the types of deviations from a comprehensive
plan that they will consider inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan.es To evaluate the different positions, this subsection focuses on
arguments over changes to intensity of use within a vested DRI pro-

ject. 19 On one hand, some courts take the view that changes to intensity of use which result in lower impact to an area are valid, provided
that the reasonableness of the changes is "fairly debatable."'u The
195
fairly debatable test is a familiar one in the area of zoning regulation.

190. Id. § 163.3194(3)(a).
191. Id. § 163.3194(4)(b). This clause was part of the original statute passed in i975. Id. §
163.3194(3)(b). Its continuation into the present framework may be mere inadvertance, in which
case it should be removed as an anomaly.
192. See infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
193. Although the focus here is on changes in intensity of use, the substantial deviation
subsection also looks to new uses, types of uses, multiple uses, extensions of buildout dates,
and other changes as substantial deviations. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10) (1991). In addition to being
substantial deviations, these types of changes are also usually inconsistent with a comprehensive
plan. See, e.g., Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 633 n.4 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (more
intense uses are subject to strict scrutiny); Alachua County v. Eagle's Nest Farms, Inc., 473
So. 2d 257, 261 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (different type of use impairs the intent and purpose of
the comprehensive plan). Thus, these types of changes to a DRI are per se inappropriate because
they contradict the comprehensive plan, and should be barred. The substantial deviation subsection merely allows some leeway to developers in the enforcement of this provision to their
development.
194. Southwest Ranches Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987).
195. Machado, 519 So. 2d at 632. See 8a E. McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
25.281 (3d ed. 1986) ("where the relationship of zoning to the... police power is fairly debatable,
ordinarily courts will not interfere"); 4 N. WILLIAMS, 4 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §
92.02 (1986); 7 FLA. JuR. 2D § 107. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Madison, 508 So. 2d 754, 755
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987); Palm Beach County v. Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1987) (both cases assume general acceptance of fairly debatable standard). But see Synder v.
Brevard County Bd. of Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1991). The Snyder case is
important because the Fifth District Court of Appeal squarely addresses the issue of what level
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The idea that only decreased use is acceptable and increased use is
not may reflect the traditional, and now disfavored,1 principle of
Euclidean zoning. Under a Euclidean analysis, more intense uses include less intense uses. 197 As will be shown, this position not only
contradicts fundamental planning concepts but also is inefficient, counterproductive, and ultimately self-defeating.
On the other hand, some courts take the view that any change
from the comprehensive plan, whether reducing or increasing use, is
unacceptable. 19 Although not yet the majority rule in Florida, this
view most efficiently implements comprehensive planning. Unfortunately, Florida's DRI substantial deviation subsection mirrors the opposite position; namely, that changes resulting in less impact are acceptable. Because this contradicts the more efficient position that any
change is potentially unacceptable, the substantial deviations provisions of section 380.06 need significant changes. Case law illustrates
the contradictory positions taken by the courts.
Perhaps the most important opinion analyzing the consistency question was a concurring opinion. In City of Cape Canaveralv. Mosher,
Judge Cowart of the Fifth District Court of Appeal concurred in a
decision invalidating an ordinance that would have rezoned a property
to a less intensive use. - The city disputed the landowner's claim that
the proposed rezoning was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. 2°°
In a footnote, Judge Cowart pointed out that "[t]he city's argument
is based upon an early zoning concept that the purpose of zoning was
to protect the property in a zone from less desirable uses than that
specifically permitted. The concept is called 'cumulative' or 'pyramid'

of judicial review is appropriate for a rezoning decision of a local government. Id. at 80-82.
Following the lead of the Oregon courts, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that rezoning
decisions are subject to "close judicial review." Id. at 76-82 (citing Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973) (en banc)). Whether judicial review will equate to a strict
scrutiny standard remains to be seen. In any event, the future of the fairly debatable standard
in the rezoning context is beyond the scope of this note. However, this area is extremely
important and warrants further study.
196. See 2 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 14.01(1)-(2) (1988); Seimon,
Larsen & Porter, supra note 38, at 54-56; see also 4 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 195, § 96.02.
See generally Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law § 55-59 (1975).
197. For example, in Euclidean zoning schemes residential uses are the highest, or most
restricted use. Any zone of lower or less restricted use, such as an industrial zone, includes
residential uses. Therefore, residential zones exclude industrial uses, but industrial zones include
residential uses. See generally supra note 196.
198. Machado, 519 So. 2d at 629.
199. 467 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1987).
200. Id.
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style of zoning. 201 Judge Cowart correctly pointed out that the idea
that more intense use classifications include the less intense use classifications is "generally considered poor planning . . . and the better
practice is to restrict each different use and each different intensity
to its own zone. " Accordingly, "the city's rezoning of the owner's
land to a more restrictive classification permitting less intensive use
than the use provided for in its comprehensive land use (zoning) plan
was inconsistent with its plan and contrary to the dictates of section
163.3194(1), Florida Statutes." 2° Judge Cowart's opinion is the clearest
statement to date of the view that any substantial deviation, even one
resulting in a less intense use, is inconsistent with a comprehensive
plan.
A case adopting a contrasting position to Judge Cowart's view is
City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs.204 In that case, the city denied
the property owner's rezoning application. 2°5 On appeal, the developer
attacked the denial on grounds that the existing zoning scheme 2° was
inconsistent with a new comprehensive plan.2 ° The court rejected this
charge, stating that the comprehensive plan is only a "general guideline
for community growth . . . [i]t was not intended to accomplish immediate land use changes and legally did not do so." 20 The court
quoted with approval an Oregon court's view on the meaning of consistency:
[a] comprehensive plan only establishes a long-range
maximum limit on the possible intensity of local use . . .
[t]he present use of land may, by zoning ordinance, continue
to be more limited than the future use contemplated by the
comprehensive plan. It is just as much a legislative judgment
when the local governing body is called upon to decide

201. Id. at n.4 ("Cumulative" and "pyramid" zoning are the same as "Euclidean" zoning.).
See generally supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
202. Mosher, 467 So. 2d at 470 n.4.
203. Id. at 471.
204. 461 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984).
205. Id. at 161.
206. In this case, the zoning scheme consisted of "step-down" zoning. Id. This scheme calls
for a block of commercial uses next to a highway and residential uses on the block behind the
commercial strip. Id. However, the zoning divides the first block of residential uses down the
middle between multi-family and single-family uses, and single-family uses occupy the whole of
the third block away from the highway. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 162.
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whether "the future has arrived" and it is therefore appropriate to conform zoning with planning.209
The Grubbs court agreed with Judge Cowart that a more intense use
will not be granted such deferential status.2 10 Presumably, the Grubbs
court reasoned that a more intense use exceeds the "long range limits"
set by the comprehensive plan. Despite the apparent agreement between the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, these courts
occupy irreconcilable positions on an issue affecting every facet of
growth management legislation.
2.

Contradiction with State Planning Goals

The positions taken by the Grubbs court and the Oregon court 21
are not facially unreasonable. However, the idea that less use is better
use is not necessarily true. 212 In fact, in Florida such a doctrine conflicts
with several goals of the state comprehensive plan.213 For instance,
one goal of the state comprehensive plan is affordable housing.2' 4 Local
governments may intend that the areas designated for more intense
use will achieve this goal. 215 Therefore, a doctrine that permits changes
to a DRI resulting in less intense use conflicts with this goal. The
view that statutorily imposed intensity levels are only a "cap" or
"maximum allowable use" ignores that negative effects on comprehensive planning result from less intense uses.
Allowing less intense uses within a more intense use classification
also thwarts another state planning goal: compact urban growth. State
planning goals implicitly call for compact urban growth.216 Former

209. Id. at 163 (quoting Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or. App. 131, 133-34, 552 P.2d
552, 553, rev. denied, 276 Or. 133 (1976)). Accord Southwest Ranches Homeowners Assoc., 502
So. 2d at 936 (court looks for a flexible approach to the determination of consistency).
210. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 163 n.3 (more intense uses subjected to strict scrutiny).
211. Marracci, 26 Or. App. at 131, 552 P.2d at 552.
212. See supra notes 195-96.
213. See supra note 186.

214.

FLA. STAT.

§ 187.201(5) (1991).

215. It would also conflict with general principles of zoning. See supra notes 195-96 and
accompanying text.
216. See FLA. STAT. § 187.201(16)(b)(2) (1991) (encouraging separation of urban and rural
areas); id. § 187.201(17)(a) (encouraging centralization of commerical, governmental, retail, residential, and cultural uses into downtown areas); id. § 187.201(18)(b)(1) (encouraging use of
existing facilities). But see id. § 163.3161(3) (stating that purpose of comprehensive planning is
to "prevent the overcrowding of land and undue concentration of population"). See also DeGrove
& Stroud, supra note 118, at 576-77; McPherson, Cumulative Zoning and the Developing Law
of Consistency with Local Comprehensive Plans, 61 FLA. B.J. 71, 72-73 (July/Aug. 1987). Both
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DCA Secretary Thomas Pelham stated that "promoting compact urban
development patterns would be the major criteria used by the department in reviewing local comprehensive plans."217Allowing less intense
use in a more intense use classification ignores this goal of containing
urban sprawl. Thus, promoting more intense uses is fundamental to
achieving the goal of compact urban growth.
Another problem is that allowing a less intense use in a more
intense use classification exacerbates the demand for more intense
uses. Usually a local government has a reason for requiring a more
intense use in a certain part of its jurisdiction rather than in another
part. Reasons could include environmental concerns or construction
costs. Thus, a developer's unilateral decrease in the intensity of use
may force local governments to place a more intense use in an area
where the more intense use causes more damage to the environment
or costs more to build than if the more intense use had remained
where originally contemplated. In addition, the unsatisfied pressure
for more intense use may require unwarranted, time-consuming, and
expensive amendments to the comprehensive plan. The more delay
involved before the implementation of a comprehensive plan, the longer
it takes for the effects of the plan to be felt.
C.

Advantages of a Strict Consistency Requirement in
Evaluating SubstantialDeviation Standards
1. Elimination of Nonconforming Uses

Given the above arguments, understanding why the DRI
framework retains its carte blanche allowance for decreased use is
difficult. 218 As noted previously, vested DRIs also constitute gigantic
nonconforming uses. 219 The elimination of nonconforming uses is a recognized goal of local governmental planningro although Florida takes

the DeGrove article and the McPherson article discuss the interplay of state planning goals with
the theoretical underpinnings of consistency.
217. McPherson, supra note 216, at 73.
218. See supra notes 195-96.
219. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
220. 8a E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 195 § 25.180 (public policy is to restrict-and eventually
eliminate nonconforming uses); see Town of Redington Shores v. Innocenti, 455 So. 2d 642, 643
(Fla.2d D.C.A. 1984) ("lain extension of a nonconforming use... is not lawful" in a noncumulative zoning scheme.). Government may create amortization schedules under which nonconforming
uses are actively eliminated. See 8a E. MCQUILLIN, supranote 195, § 25.180 (discussing termination and amortization); D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.52 (1982) (discussing amortization
of nonconformities). See generally 7 FLA. JUR. 2D, Building, Zoning and Land Controls § 131
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a stricter view than most states on attempts to eliminate uses in
derogation of landowner's rights.2 1 The DRI structure mirrors a
Grubbs analysis and allows reductions in use but bars increases beyond
a certain magnitude.- A Judge Cowart-type approach to evaluating
proposed deviations from a vested DRI project would be a more efficient way of eliminating, or at least controlling, these nonconforming
uses. Specifically, a Judge Cowart-type approach would require that
any deviation, whether increasing or decreasing the intensity of a use
in a vested DRI, would be a substantial deviation if the increase or
decrease in intensity exceeded a predetermined magnitude. After a
change creates a substantial deviation, the project loses its vested
status and must conform to the new comprehensive plan. Therefore,
a strict consistency requirement provides a powerful means for
eliminating nonconforming uses.
2. More Flexibility for Local Governments
The idea of using a Judge Cowart-type approach to evaluate
changes to a vested DRI is also more in line with contemporary notions
of planning.m Moreover, the idea benefits local governments because
it gives them greater flexibility in dealing with proposed changes to
vested DRIs. This increase in flexibility occurs because the local government can interpret its own plan and decide whether a proposed
change furthers the goals of the plan.- An example will illustrate
this point.
Suppose the local government passes a new comprehensive plan
which, if applicable to the DRI, requires a more intense use of the
property. Our hypothetical DRI, though, has a vested right to complete the project because it obtained a final development order in
accordance with section 380.06.2 Now the developer wants to make
(policy is to secure the gradual or eventual elimination of nonconforming uses); id. § 133 (generally
accepted method is to not permit any change which would or might extend the nonconformity);
82 AM. JUR. 2D, Zoning and Planning § 179, § 181.
221. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Crescent City, 503 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1987).
In that case, the court said that "[b]ecause 'zoning regulations are in derogation of private rights
of ownership, words used in a zoning ordinance should be given their broadest meaning when
there is no definition or clear intent to the contrary and the ordinance should be interpreted in
favor of the property owner."' Id. at 1301 (quoting Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of N. Miami,
286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1973)). The state comprehensive plan also includes the protection of
property rights. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(15)(a) (1991).
222. See supra notes 186, 204-10 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 195-96.
224. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
225. In this hypothetical, we will assume the project vested under a development order so
we can avoid any arguments over whether equitable estoppel gives the developer a right to
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changes to the DRI that result in less impact to the area. The substantial deviation provisions of the DRI statute2 6 allow changes resulting
in less impact despite the comprehensive plan's requirements. Permitting these changes not only fails to further the goals of the comprehensive plan, but actually expands the existing nonconforming use; the
nonconforming use is now even further from complying with the comprehensive plan. Thus, the expansion of a nonconforming use and the
loss of local governments' flexibility in implementing comprehensive
plans are the disadvantages of the Grubbs-type analysis of consistency
used in the DRI framework.
Another hypothetical shows the advantages of changing the DRI
substantial deviation criteria to reflect a Judge Cowart-type approach.
In this hypothetical, not only are nonconforming uses eliminated, but
also local governments regain control over proposed changes to vested
DRIs. This time, suppose that the new comprehensive plan calls for
a less intense use than planned for by the vested DRI project. To
allow changes to the DRI resulting in a less intense use would seem
far more acceptable in this situation than in the above hypothetical,
and indeed it is. A less intense use furthers the goals of the comprehensive plan and simultaneously reduces the size of a nonconforming use.
Both of these are valid goals.
The problem with this hypothetical is that section 380.06 allows
the developer to determine the amount of decrease. Therefore, the
developer determines how closely the vested DRI will comply with
the comprehensive plan. Although not an entirely unacceptable situation, a Judge Cowart-type approach to evaluating substantial deviations sends this determination back to the local government. Under
a Judge Cowart-type approach, any deviation beyond a certain magnitude constitutes a substantial deviation and a loss of vested status.
After a DRI loses its vested status, it must comply fully with the
new comprehensive plan.m Thus, the local government acquires
another method for obtaining full compliance with the comprehensive
plan. The Judge Cowart approach achieves the goals of less intense
use and elimination of nonconforming use.
A counterargument is that the above result might discourage a
developer from making any changes to a vested DRI even if the

continue. Another problem in the equitable estoppel question is this: even if equitable estoppel
applies, how far will the right to develop extend? This issue is dealt with in the preceding part
of this note.
226. See supra notes 186, 193 and accompanying text.
227. See FLA. STAT. §§ 380.06(19)(g)-(h), 163.3194(1)(a), (3)(a)-(b) (1991).
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changes resulted in a decreased use. The developer might fear that
the project would lose its vested status. However, this fear is avoidable. In St. Johns County v. Owings, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that "[i]f a comprehensive plan is capable of being interpreted in two or more different ways, it is error for the court not to
give the zoning authority's interpretation deference over its own
view. ' 22 The court concluded that "reasonable interpretations accorded
[the comprehensive plan] . . . should not be interfered with by the
Following this
court unless clearly unauthorized or erroneous."
reasoning, a local government could decide that certain proposed reductions, although not in literal compliance, further the intent and
aims of the comprehensive plan. It could then reason that some decrease in intensity of use is better than no decrease at all. Therefore,
a local government could allow changes that are closer to, but not in
strict compliance with, the requirements of its comprehensive plan.
D.

Conclusion

In evaluating substantial deviations in a DRI, the Judge Cowarttype approach is the preferred position. It eliminates nonconforming
uses, furthers the goals of the comprehensive planning system, and
gives a local government an added measure of flexibility in implementing its comprehensive plan. The continuation of the current substantial
deviation requirements might merely be a reflection of the dichotomy
between the traditional concepts of Euclidean zoning, in force at the
time of original adoption of the DRI framework, and currently accepted
concepts of consistency in planning. On the other hand, it might be a
mere oversight.2 0 In any event, the tension created by continuing the

228. 554 So. 2d 535, 543 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1989).
229. Id. at 543 (citing P.W. Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1988); City
of DeLand v. Lowe, 544 So. 2d :[165, 1169 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1989)).
230. Area-wide development plans encompass at least two or more developments. FLA.
STAT. § 380.06(25)(a)(1)(A) (1991). A review of the provisions for substantial deviations in plans
for area-wide developments of regional impact supports the view that the legislature is aware
of the difference in planning concepts. See id. § 380.06(25). There are several interesting things
about the area-wide development of regional impact procedures. First, the term is a misnomer.
Second, the substantial deviation requirements are different and contradictory.
First, if a "development of regional impact" is a development that affects two or more
counties, and hence the region, what is a DRI that affects an "area"? Is an "area" larger than
the region? If so, why does the project only have to be reviewed under the subsection of
area-wide DRIs as opposed to regular DRIs? See id. § 380.06(25)(g). Also, why call it an
Area-Wide Development of Regional Impact and not a Development of Area Impact? The Florida
Statutes define the term "area," but use it incorrectly at least once. "Area" is the land in an
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current substantial deviation standards leads to confusion and undermines the goals of comprehensive planning. Therefore, the criteria for
evaluating substantial deviations should be changed to reflect the
Judge Cowart-type approach. Any deviation beyond a certain magnitude should be deemed a substantial deviation requiring the DRI to
undergo further review. This change will not only help further implementation of local government comprehensive plans, but will also
add a measure of symmetry to Florida planning law.
Morgan R. Bentley

incorporated municipality, the unincorporated county, or a combination of the two. See id. §
163.3164(2). Therefore, an area is limited to a county, and a region must consist of more than
one county. See id. § 380.06(1). However, under the section on Areas of State Concern, one
area includes more than one county. See id. § 380.0551(1) (definition includes Lake County and
Polk County in the Green Swamp Area). Therefore, the term "area" is used differently within
the same statute chapter. This inconsistency makes the statute worthless as a tool for discovering
the meaning of the term.
The review procedures for area-wide DRIs are more helpful in determining the scope of an
"area." In the area-wide DRI review, the RPC does not prepare a report for submission to the
local government. Instead, the local government prepares the application. Id. § 380.06(25)(d).
After the local government approves the plan, it is sent to the RPC and DCA for review. Id.
§ 380.06(25)(g). The procedure for review of an area-wide DRI is almost the exact opposite
procedure from a normal DRI review. See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text. The local
governments have much greater control over the entire approval procedure. Correspondingly,
the subsection focuses on local governments with general jurisdiction over the project. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that area-wide DRIs are smaller versions of the regular DRI
process. The substantial deviation criteria for an area-wide DRI, which are twice that for regular
DRI substantial deviations, support this proposition. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(25)(n) (1991). It is
logical to allow more leeway to a smaller project than a large one because the marginal increase
of impact in a smaller project is not as large as a marginal increase of impact in a larger project.
A second interesting feature of the area-wide DRI section is the substantial deviation criteria.
At first glance, area-wide DRI substantial deviation criteria would seem to be exactly the same
as the regular DRI substantial deviation criteria except twice as large. Id. § 380.06(25)(n).
Under the current regulations, this means that the statute allows an area-wide DRI to reduce
the densities in the development without incurring additional DRI review. See supra note 185
and accompanying text. However, the first clause of the subsection states that "all development
within the defined planning area shall conform to the approved areawide development plan and
development order." FLA. STAT. § 380.06(25)(a) (1991) (emphasis added). This suggests that
the statute bars any changes not in complete conformity to the area-wide development plan. If
this is the case, then substantial deviation requirements under an area-wide DRI review are
significantly different than in a regular DRI review. In any event, this constitutes an extreme
inconsistency and should be eliminated.
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